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Congress and the Treasury have commissioned the National Academy of 
Sciences (NAS) “to undertake a comprehensive review of the Internal 
Revenue Code of 1986 to identify the types of and specific tax provisions 
that have the largest effects on carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions 
and to estimate the magnitude of those effects.” The hope of the 
proponents of the NAS carbon audit is that Congress, once informed of 
the results of the audit, will respond by “greening” the Internal Revenue 
Code. This Essay cautions that a more environmentally friendly Code 
will not necessarily follow from the legislative consciousness-raising of the 
carbon audit. It offers the story of the “SUV loophole” as a case study in 
the difficulty of removing environmentally offensive provisions from the 
tax laws, even when Congress is well aware of the existence of those 
provisions.  
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE OF GREENING THE CODE 
In 2008 Congress directed the Secretary of the Treasury to: “enter 
into an agreement with the National Academy of Sciences [NAS] to 
undertake a comprehensive review of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
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to identify the types of and specific tax provisions that have the largest 
effects on carbon and other greenhouse gas emissions and to estimate 
the magnitude of those effects.”1 The legislation called for the NAS to 
submit its report (carbon audit) to Congress by October 4, 2010, but the 
$1.5 million required to fund the study was not appropriated until 
December 2009.2 The report is now not expected until late 2011. The 
hope of the proponents of the carbon audit, of course, is that once the 
NAS has highlighted “the potential for changes in the tax code to reduce 
carbon emissions,”3 Congress will respond by “greening” the Internal 
Revenue Code. 
The carbon audit is certainly a worthwhile project. Some of the ways 
in which the current tax laws may contribute to global warming are far 
from obvious,4 and making Congress aware of such non-obvious effects is 
a necessary first step in persuading Congress to amend the Code to 
alleviate those effects. I am sure, however, that the proponents of the 
carbon audit are under no illusions that the greening of the Code will 
follow readily once Congress’s consciousness has been raised by the NAS 
study. My own view is pessimistic; I doubt if any Code provisions that 
encourage the emission of greenhouse gases will be repealed in the 
aftermath of the carbon audit.  
In support of that view, this Essay offers—as a case study in the 
difficulty of removing environmentally offensive tax breaks from the 
Code—the story of the “SUV loophole.” Most taxpayers who buy 
expensive vehicles for business use are subject to strict limitations on 
their allowable cost-recovery deductions, but a small business owner who 
buys a sport utility vehicle with a gross vehicle weight of more than 6,000 
pounds (making it environmentally objectionable even relative to other 
 
1 Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 117, 
122 Stat. 3807, 3831 (2008). I have previously offered the NAS my unsolicited advice 
as to how it should select Code provisions for inclusion in the carbon audit. See 
Lawrence Zelenak, Tax Expenditures and the Carbon Audit, 122 TAX NOTES 1367 (2009) 
(proposing that the NAS include in the audit any existing tax provision satisfying two 
criteria: (1) that there is a technically and politically plausible alternative to the 
current provision, and (2) that the current provision and the alternative to it would 
have significantly different effects on greenhouse gas emissions). 
2 See § 117, 122 Stat. at 3831; Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-117, § 4, 123 Stat. 3034, 3159 (2009). 
3 Press Release, Earl Blumenauer, Reps. Blumenauer, McDermott, and Neal 
Highlight House Passage of New Direction Energy Policy (May 20, 2008), available at 
http://blumenauer.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1322. 
4 For example, the home mortgage interest deduction may encourage suburban 
sprawl, which leads to longer commutes in single-occupant vehicles, which leads to 
increased carbon dioxide emissions. See Roberta F. Mann, The (Not So) Little House on 
the Prairie: The Hidden Costs of the Home Mortgage Interest Deduction, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1347, 1370–71 (2000); Richard Voith, Does the Federal Tax Treatment of Housing Affect the 
Pattern of Metropolitan Development?, BUS. REV., Mar./Apr. 1999, at 3, 3–6. 
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SUVs)5 may immediately deduct $25,000 of its cost under the small 
business expensing rules of section 179 of the Code.6 A business taxpayer 
paying $60,000 in 2011 for a new Cadillac sedan could claim a first-year 
cost-recovery deduction of $11,060.7 But if the taxpayer instead bought—
at the same price and in the same year—a new Cadillac Escalade SUV 
(gross vehicle weight 7,300 pounds), he would be able to deduct the 
entire $60,000 cost in 2011.8 These 2011 results are affected by the 
temporary “bonus depreciation” rules of section 168(k). Under the 
permanent rules (that is, in the absence of section 168(k)), a taxpayer 
buying a sedan would be entitled to a first-year deduction of only $3,060,9 
and a taxpayer buying an SUV would be entitled to a first-year deduction 
of $32,000—$25,000 under section 179 and another $7,000 derived by 
the application of the cost-recovery rules of section 168 to the remaining 
$35,000 of the cost of the vehicle.10 
Although the SUV loophole is neither the most economically 
significant nor the most environmentally damaging of the Internal 
Revenue Code’s offenses against the environment, it is among the most 
transparent and the most outrageous. Whether viewed from the 
perspective of tax policy, energy policy, or environmental policy, it is 
simply and obviously indefensible.11 Consider tax policy first. The 
limitations on deductions for the business use of luxury automobiles 
(imposed by section 280F) are designed to avoid “subsidiz[ing] the 
element of personal consumption associated with the use of very 
expensive automobiles.”12 The personal consumption element inherent 
in the Escalade is every bit as significant as the personal consumption 
element inherent in the sedan, yet the tax system does nothing to avoid 
subsidizing that consumption. As for energy policy: At a time when 
reducing the United States’ dependence on foreign oil is widely viewed 
 
5 See infra Part II.A. 
6 I.R.C. § 179 (2006). 
7 Rev. Proc. 2011-21, 2011-12 I.R.B. 560, 561 tbl.1 (March 21, 2011); I.R.C. 
§ 168(k)(2)(F)(i). 
8 He could either (1) deduct $25,000 under section 179 and the remaining 
$35,000 under section 168(k)(5), or (2) simply deduct the entire $60,000 under 
section 168(k)(5). 
9 Rev. Proc. 2011-21, supra note 7, at 562 tbl.3. 
10 See Rev. Proc. 87-57, 1987-2 C.B. at 696 tbl.1. 
11 One of the best policy critiques of the SUV loophole appeared several year ago 
in these pages. See Carrie M. Dupic, The SUV Tax Loophole: Today’s Quintessential 
Suburban Passenger Vehicle Becomes Small Businesses’ Quintessential Tax Break, 9 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 669 (2005). 
12 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE 
REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, at 599 (1984). 
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as a matter of national security,13 the tax subsidy for low-mileage SUVs14 
encourages increased dependence on foreign-source energy. The effects 
of large SUVs on global warming are straightforward. Burning gasoline 
produces the greenhouse gas carbon dioxide, and low-mileage vehicles 
produce more carbon dioxide per mile than more fuel-efficient vehicles. 
On a scale of zero (worst) to ten (best), the Environmental Protection 
Agency gives the Escalade a “greenhouse gas score” of three.15 For 
comparison, a Cadillac CTS sedan (with a six-cylinder engine and semi-
automatic transmission) has a score of six.16 
In addition to being indefensible on the merits, the SUV loophole 
would seem to have little going for it politically. The loophole owes its 
existence to a historical accident, rather than to a legislative decision to 
subsidize purchasers of SUVs.17 It is difficult to imagine a tax provision 
better suited to generating outrage among the general public. The 
provision itself is easily understood, the objections to it are obvious and 
visceral, and once outrage has been generated it can be rekindled by 
every sighting of a large SUV. The loophole was thoroughly exposed and 
derided by the national media as early as 2002;18 the George W. Bush 
administration publicly favored its repeal;19 the Alliance of Automobile 
Manufacturers made no attempt to defend it;20 and a number of 
legislators targeted it for repeal.21 And yet, even with the stars seemingly 
perfectly aligned for its repeal, the SUV deduction survives. Commenting 
in 2002 on the possible repeal of the SUV loophole, Dan Becker, the 
director of the Sierra Club’s global-warming and energy program, 
demonstrated both prescience and a capacity for understatement by 
noting that “tax breaks are typically tough to erase once they are on the 
books.”22 If Congress has not seen fit to repeal the tax subsidy for 
purchasers of large SUVs, how likely is it that other provisions—
 
13 See Richard N. Haass, Foreward to COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, NATIONAL 
SECURITY CONSEQUENCES OF U.S. OIL DEPENDENCY, at xi–xii (Indep. Task Force Rep. 
No. 58, 2006). 
14 The Environmental Protection Agency estimates the Escalade’s mileage at 14 
miles per gallon city, and 20 miles per gallon highway. The EPA’s mileage estimates 
for all new vehicle models are available at THE OFFICIAL U.S. GOVERNMENT SOURCE FOR 
FUEL ECONOMY INFORMATION, http://www.fueleconomy.gov/. 
15 GREEN VEHICLE GUIDE, http://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/Index.do.  
16 Id. 
17 See infra Part II.A. 
18 See infra Part II.B. 
19 See infra text accompanying note 66. 
20 See infra text accompanying note 67. 
21 See infra text accompanying note 46. 
22 Jeffrey Ball & Karen Lundegaard, Tax Breaks for the Merely Affluent: Quirk in Law 
Lets Some SUV Drivers Take Big Deduction, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2002, at D1. 
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seemingly far less politically vulnerable than this one—will be repealed in 
response to the carbon audit of the Internal Revenue Code?  
II. THE STORY OF THE SUV LOOPHOLE 
A. A Loophole is Born 
Congress enacted the section 280F restrictions on depreciation 
deductions for “luxury automobiles” in 1984.23 The restrictions did not 
apply, however, to any vehicle with a gross vehicle weight of more than 
6,000 pounds.24 Qualifying for the exception produced two benefits. First, 
the taxpayer could use the usual accelerated cost-recovery rules of section 
168, rather than being relegated to delayed cost recovery under section 
280F.25 Second, a small business taxpayer could claim an immediate 
deduction under section 179 for up to $5,000 of the cost of the vehicle.26 
The exception was self-evidently based on the congressional assumption 
that a taxpayer’s choice of a vehicle weighing more than three tons would 
be based solely on business concerns; no one would derive personal 
consumption benefits from such a behemoth. As of 1984, that 
assumption was basically correct. The first SUV—in the modern sense of 
a vehicle designed for, and marketed to, suburban families as an 
alternative to a car—was the 1984 Jeep Cherokee (introduced in late 
1983).27 Its gross vehicle weight was 4,629 pounds.28 At the time the 
luxury automobile deduction restrictions were enacted, there was no car-
substitute SUV with a gross vehicle weight of more than 6,000 pounds. In 
the absence of such a vehicle, Congress was right to assume that the use 
of a vehicle weighing more than 6,000 pounds would be based on 
business needs, rather than on personal preferences.  
That assumption was eventually undermined by changes in the tastes 
of the American driving public. The SUV as an alternative to a car surged 
in popularity in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s. In 1975, large 
SUVs constituted only 0.1% of all new light-duty vehicles sold in the 
United States; the market share of large SUVs rose to 0.5% by 1988, and 
 
23 Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 179, 98 Stat. 494, 713 
(1984). 
24 The current version of the exception, which applies to any “truck or van” with 
a gross vehicle weight of more than 6,000 pounds, is codified at I.R.C. 
§ 280F(d)(5)(A) (2006).  
25 See § 179, 98 Stat. at 713. 
26 See id. § 13, at 505. 
27 KEITH BRADSHER, HIGH AND MIGHTY: SUVS—THE WORLD’S MOST DANGEROUS 
VEHICLES AND HOW THEY GOT THAT WAY 37, 40 (2002). 
28 Tori Tellem, 1984–1988 Jeep Cherokee/Wagoner XJ: Killing off Jeep’s Biggest Success, 
JP MAGAZINE, Feb. 2009, http://www.jpmagazine.com/featuredvehicles 
/154_0609_1984_to_1988_jeep_cherokee_and_wagoner/index.html. 
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skyrocketed to 11.8% by 2006.29 Over the same period that the large SUV 
was becoming the personal-use vehicle of choice for many drivers, 
Congress was increasing the tax advantage of the exemption from the 
luxury automobile deduction restrictions. The maximum deduction 
under section 179 reached $24,000 in 2002, and $25,000 in 2003.30 
B. The Loophole Thrives on Exposure 
The SUV deduction remained a bit of tax arcana, known only to a 
limited number of small business owners and their accountants, until a 
story appeared in the December 18, 2002 edition of the Detroit News.31 
The story described a healthcare consultant, Karl Wizinsky, who bought a 
Ford Excursion for $47,000 and claimed a deduction for $32,000 of the 
purchase price; he explained that he chose the Excursion “because it was 
a pretty hefty deduction.”32 The story noted the tension between the SUV 
deduction and “other national goals, such as . . . reducing U.S. 
dependence on foreign oil and cutting greenhouse gasses.”33 The story 
cited Taxpayers for Common Sense (a self-described “independent and 
non-partisan voice for taxpayers”)34 for its estimate that the deduction 
cost the Treasury “between $840 million and $987 million for every 
100,000 [deduction-eligible] vehicles sold to businesses.”35 It noted that 
38 models of light trucks (a classification covering vans and pickups, in 
addition to SUVs) were heavy enough to qualify for the tax break, and 
that 3.8 million light trucks had been sold in 2001.36 
The national media quickly picked up the story. Within the next few 
days, stories describing and criticizing the SUV deduction appeared in 
the Wall Street Journal (noting that “a tax break that was at least partly 
intended to help farmers buy pickup trucks is now being applied to 
today’s quintessential suburban passenger vehicle”),37 the New York Times 
(describing three internists sharing a practice, each of whom had 
purchased a deduction-eligible SUV, and quoting the remark of a 
spokesperson for an environmental organization that “Congress needs to 
 
29 ROBERT M. HEAVENRICH, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 420-R-06-011, LIGHT-DUTY 
AUTOMOTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND FUEL ECONOMY TRENDS: 1975 THROUGH 2006, at 21 
(2006). 
30 Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1111(a), 110 
Stat. 1755, 1758 (1996). 
31 Jeff Plungis, SUV, Truck Owners Get a Big Tax Break: Loophole Allows Hefty Write-
Off for Vehicles, DETROIT NEWS, Dec. 18, 2002, at C1. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 TAXPAYERS FOR COMMON SENSE, http://www.taxpayer.net/. 
35 Plungis, supra note 31, at C1. 
36 Id. 
37 Ball & Lundegaard, supra note 22, at D1. 
Do Not Delete 4/15/2011  1:29 PM 
2011] THE LOOPHOLE THAT WOULD NOT DIE 475 
 
step up and close this loophole”),38 National Public Radio (interviewing a 
spokesperson for Taxpayers for Common Sense, who favored the repeal 
of the deduction),39 and ABC World News Tonight with Peter Jennings 
(featuring the reporter’s observation, “[a]t a time when the nation’s 
priorities are to improve gas mileage and reduce dependence on foreign 
oil, the government has instead provided an incentive for just the 
opposite, the biggest, least efficient SUVs available”).40 A Los Angeles Times 
editorial advocated repeal of the SUV loophole “[t]o rein in the wasteful 
symbolism of this law.”41  
In early January 2003, a columnist for the Atlanta Journal-Constitution 
described the SUV deduction as “[s]ound[ing] too good to be true,” and 
predicted its imminent demise: “So if you’re planning to take advantage 
of this deal, do it soon. I don’t think it will be around much longer.”42 It 
seemed a reasonable prediction at the time, but it could not have been 
more wrong. A few days earlier, President Bush had proposed tripling the 
section 179 deduction ceiling, from $25,000 to $75,000.43 Nothing in the 
President’s proposal was SUV-specific—it applied to all section 179-
eligible assets, and there is no indication that he was thumbing his nose 
at the critics of the SUV deduction—but enactment of the proposal 
would have hugely increased the existing tax preference for large SUVs 
over cars and smaller SUVs. It did not take the Detroit News long to call 
attention to that aspect of the proposal with a front-page story.44 The 
story quoted the reaction of an excited Hummer dealer—either 
engaging in hyperbole or displaying an imperfect understanding of the 
effect of a tax deduction—“Oh, you’ve got to be kidding . . . . That would 
make a Hummer practically free.”45 Senator Barbara Boxer quickly 
leaped into the fray, introducing a bill (co-sponsored by Senators Hillary 
Clinton and Charles Schumer) to subject SUVs weighing over 6,000 
 
38 Danny Hakim, In Tax Twist, Big Vehicles Get the Bigger Deductions, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 20, 2002, at C1 (quoting one of the internists, “I have one partner who just did it 
with a Suburban”). 
39 Interview by Bob Edwards with Aileen Roder of Taxpayers for Common Sense, 
A Tax Loophole that Allows Business Owners to Depreciate SUVs More Quickly than Cars 
(NPR radio broadcast Dec. 26, 2002).  
40 SUV Loophole Benefits Wealthy, (ABC World News Tonight broadcast Dec. 27, 
2002) (transcript on file with the Lewis & Clark Law Review). 
41 Loopholes as Big as an SUV, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2002, at Cal. Metro 22. 
42 Clark Howard, Jump on Giant ‘SUV Tax Break’ While You Can, ATLANTA J.-CONST., 
Jan. 9, 2003, at 3NW. 
43 Excerpts from Bush’s Speech on His Proposal to Stimulate the Economy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 8, 2003, at A14. 
44 See Jeff Plungis, SUV Tax Break May Reach $75K: Environmentalists Bash Bush 
Plan, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 20, 2003, at A1. 
45 Id. 
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pounds to the luxury automobile deduction restrictions.46 According to 
the Detroit News, the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that Senator 
Boxer’s proposal would increase federal tax revenues by almost $1.3 
billion over ten years.47 
The Washington Post reported that, according to an unnamed “senior 
Republican tax aide,” the Senate was interested in closing the SUV 
loophole.48 Although the tax bill passed by the Senate did not repeal the 
SUV deduction, the aide indicated that the loophole had “slipped 
through as the Senate hurried to pass a bill,” and that the Senate 
negotiators in the conference committee would push for repeal of the 
deduction.49 They must not have pushed hard enough, however, because 
the SUV deduction was intact when the bill emerged from the 
conference committee.50 The President’s section 179 proposal fared 
much better, with Congress one-upping the President. Instead of tripling 
the section 179 ceiling to $75,000, the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003 quadrupled the ceiling to $100,000 (for 2003, 
2004, and 2005).51  
Automobile manufacturers took the tax break into account in 
designing their vehicles. A spokesman for General Motors told the Wall 
Street Journal that Cadillac responded to dealer complaints about the 
gross vehicle weight of its SRX model by having its engineers “re-evaluate 
the vehicle’s capabilities so that it would qualify for the tax break.”52 The 
Washington Post reported a car dealer’s observation that many new SUV 
models were just over 6,000 pounds, and his suspicion that “automakers 
have their eyes on the tax code.”53 
 
46 Barbara Boxer, Boxer Bill Would Limit Depreciation of SUVs, TAX NOTES TODAY, 
Feb. 13, 2003, available at LEXIS 2003 TNT 30-126; Edward Epstein, 2 Senators Seek 
Controls on Gas-Guzzling SUVs: Plans by Boxer, Feinstein Face Uphill Battle, S.F. CHRON., 
Jan. 30, 2003, at A2. 
47 Jeff Plungis, SUV Tax Break May Grow: Loophole that Small-Business Owners Use to 
Buy Trucks Expected to Jump to $100,000, DETROIT NEWS, May 16, 2003, at B1. 
48 Jonathan Weisman, President Supports House Tax Bill: Move Seen as Effort to Speed 
Measure, WASH. POST, May 21, 2003, at A1. 
49 Id. 
50 See H.R. REP. NO. 108-126 (2003) (Conf. Rep.). 
51 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 
§ 202, 117 Stat. 752, 757. 
52 Neal E. Boudette & Karen Lundegaard, SUV Tax Break for Businesses is Likely to 
End, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 2004, at D6. After the engineers’ tinkering, the 2004 SRX 
model had a gross vehicle weight of 6,008 pounds. 2004 Cadillac SRX, CARS.COM, 
http://www.cars.com/cadillac/srx/2004/specs/. 
53 Jonathan Weisman, Businesses Jump on an SUV Loophole; Suddenly $100,000 Tax 
Deduction Proves a Marketing Bonanza, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2003, at A1. 
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C. The Status Quo Ante Restored 
Opponents of the SUV deduction were quick to criticize its 
quadrupling. According to the Wall Street Journal, critics claimed the 
enhanced deduction was “inconsistent with the Bush administration’s 
avowed commitment to reducing U.S. dependence on foreign oil.”54 The 
Los Angeles Times editorialized: “It’s bad enough that giant SUVs guzzle 
gas and pollute the air. Congress should halt the ridiculous practice of 
the government paying people to buy them.”55 Commenting on the 
widespread criticism, Automotive News noted that one would never guess 
from the news coverage that the revenue cost of the enhanced SUV 
deduction was less than 0.5% of the tax legislation’s total revenue 
reduction: “If news stories were a proper gauge, we would have to 
conclude that the most important provision of the giant tax-cut bill that 
President Bush signed last week was what the reformers call ‘the SUV 
loophole’ or ‘the Hummer deduction.’”56 
The clamor appeared to have some effect on the Senate. In October 
2003 the Senate Finance Committee voted to re-impose a $25,000 ceiling 
on the section 179 deduction for SUVs (while retaining the $100,000 
section 179 ceiling for all other assets).57 The Committee explained its 
rationale for reducing the ceiling: 
[T]he Committee understands that some taxpayers are using 
section 179 to lower the cost of purchasing certain types of vehicles 
(1) that are not subject to the luxury automobile limitations 
imposed by Congress and (2) for which the specific features of such 
vehicle are not necessary for purposes of conducting the taxpayer’s 
business. The Committee is concerned about such market 
distortions and does not believe that the United States taxpayers 
should subsidize a portion of such purchase.58 
Senator Boxer remarked that she would prefer “clos[ing] the SUV 
loophole entirely,” but that she was “at least relieved that the Committee 
acted to repeal the expansion of the loophole enacted earlier this year.”59 
House negotiators rejected the Senate’s loophole-tightening provision,60 
 
54 Stephen Power, A Tax Break as Big as a Big SUV, WALL ST. J., May 27, 2003, at 
D2. 
55 A Hummer-Sized Loophole, L.A. TIMES, May 30, 2003, at Cal. Metro 14. 
56 Harry Stoffer, SUV Passions Overflow in Tax Debate, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, June 2, 
2003, at 14. 
57 Rob Wells, Personal Finance—Tax Report: SUV Write-Off Goes Into Reverse, WALL 
ST. J., Oct. 9, 2003, at D2. 
58 S. REP. NO. 108-192, at 195 (2003). 
59 Wells, supra note 57. 
60 Richard Simon, Energy Bill Could Pass House Today; Republicans Pack the Measure 
with State Perks as Cost Estimates of Tax Breaks Reach $23 Billion, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 18, 
2003, at A14. 
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however, and as 2003 ended the $100,000 deduction ceiling remained in 
the Code. Sales figures suggested small business owners were responsive 
to the tax incentive. Dealers sold more than 101,000 full-sized and luxury 
SUVs in January 2004, a 51% increase over sales in January 2003.61 
Strong sentiment for reeling in the deduction persisted in the 
Senate. During the October 2004 House-Senate negotiations on the 
American Jobs Creation Act, Senator Don Nickles—an Oklahoma 
Republican about to retire from the Senate—offered an amendment to 
reduce the SUV deduction under section 179 to $25,000 (while retaining 
the $100,000 ceiling for other assets, including vans and pickup trucks).62 
Senator Nickles had been “converted” on the issue by his car-dealer son, 
who called the $100,000 SUV deduction a “rip-off.”63 According to the 
Washington Post, Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas 
“mocked [Nickles’] proposal”64—unfortunately, the story provided no 
details on the nature of the mockery—but the amendment eventually 
prevailed in conference and became law.65 The amendment’s cause was 
presumably aided by a letter from Treasury Secretary John Snow 
indicating that “[t]he Administration supports complete elimination of 
the ‘SUV tax loophole,’ except for cases where there is a demonstrated 
legitimate business need for a large Sport Utility Vehicle.”66 The Alliance 
of Automobile Manufacturers did not object to Nickles’ amendment 
(although its spokesman indicated it would have preferred eliminating 
the tax disparity between SUVs and other vehicles by making all vehicles 
eligible for the $100,000 ceiling).67 The Joint Committee on Taxation 
estimated that tightening of the loophole would increase revenues by 
$137 million in 2005 and $136 million in 2006.68  
Among those who had opposed the $100,000 deduction ceiling, 
opinions differed as to whether reducing the ceiling to $25,000 solved 
the problem. Keith Ashdown of Taxpayers for Common Sense claimed 
that “[t]his fixes what is probably the biggest outrage in the tax code.”69 
 
61 Jim Hopkins, SUV Sales Climb on Tax Loophole, USA TODAY, Feb. 11, 2004, at 3B. 
62 Dustin Stamper, Luxury SUV Loophole Curbed in ETI Bill, TAX NOTES TODAY, 
Oct.15, 2004, available at LEXIS 2004 TNT 200-3. 
63 James Toedtman, Closing $100G Loophole, NEWSDAY, Oct. 26, 2004, at A46. 
64 Jonathan Weisman, Tobacco Rider Adds Fire to Debate over Corporate Tax Bill: 
Buyout, Regulation Keys in Latest Fight, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2004, at A4. 
65 See American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 910, 118 Stat. 
1418, 1659 (2004). 
66 John Snow, Snow Shares Administration’s Views on ETI Repeal Bill with Top 
Taxwriters, TAX NOTES TODAY, Oct. 6, 2004, available at LEXIS 2004 TNT 194-19. 
67 Harry Stoffer, Tax Bill Losses Outnumber Wins: Congress Cuts Tax Credits for 
Hybrids, Fuel Cells, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Oct. 11, 2004, at 8. 
68 Stamper, supra note 62. 
69 Jeff Plungis, Bill Curbs SUV Tax Write-Off: The Break for Small-Business Owners is 
Trimmed to $25,000 instead of $100,000, DETROIT NEWS, Oct. 7, 2004, at 1B. 
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His statement was somewhat surprising, in light of the fact that two years 
earlier, when the SUV deduction ceiling had been $25,000, his 
organization had strenuously called for complete repeal of the tax 
favoritism for large SUVs.70 Senator John McCain remarked on the floor 
of the Senate that the SUV tax break “is not as bad as it used to be, but it 
is still too expensive and should be eliminated.”71 National Public Radio 
commentator Connie Rice included “The Fat SUV Tax Break 
Preservation Provision” on her list of the “Top 10 Outrages of the 
Corporate Tax Bill.”72 
Other than some news coverage of taxpayers buying SUVs in 
December 200473—to take advantage of the $100,000 deduction ceiling 
before it expired—the SUV deduction has attracted little attention from 
the media since October 2004. Some members of Congress have 
continued to press for the elimination of the deduction, but without 
success. In a reversal of the situation in 2003 and 2004—when the House 
(with a Republican majority) was the obstacle to legislation to reduce or 
eliminate the deduction—in 2007 and 2008, the House (with a 
Democratic majority) passed bills repealing the deduction, but the 
Senate failed to act. Complete repeal of the SUV deduction was included 
in a renewable energy and energy conservation bill passed by the House 
in August 2007, but the Bush White House threatened a veto (not 
because of the SUV provision) and the bill died in the Senate.74 The 
House passed a very similar renewable energy and energy conservation 
bill—also featuring complete repeal of the SUV deduction—in February 
2008, but the White House again promised a veto and the bill again died 
in the Senate.75 
III. CONCLUSION 
In many ways, the SUV deduction seemed especially vulnerable to 
repeal. It had originated as an accidental subsidy. It favored a product 
that was disliked and resented by many Americans. It managed 
 
70 Interview with Aileen Roder, supra note 39. 
71 150 CONG. REC. 23,288 (2004) (statement of Sen. John McCain). 
72 Connie Rice, Top 10 Outrages of the Corporate Tax Bill, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 
20, 2004), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4117683. 
73 See, e.g., Michelle Higgins, Big Tax Break Prompts SUV Sales: Shoppers Scramble to 
Buy Before Dec. 31 Deadline; What It Takes to Qualify, WALL ST. J., Dec. 23, 2004, at D6. 
74 H.R. 2776, 110th Cong. § 206 (2007); 153 CONG. REC. H9951 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 
2007)(passage of H.R. 2776); White House, Office of Mgmt. & Budget, White House 
Threatens Veto of House Energy Bills, TAX NOTES TODAY, Aug. 6, 2007, available at LEXIS 
2007 TNT 151-61. 
75 H.R. 5351, 110th Cong. § 203 (2008); 154 CONG. REC. H1131 (daily ed. Feb. 
27, 2008) (passage of H.R. 5351); Meg Shreve, House Passes Energy Tax Package, TAX 
NOTES TODAY, Feb. 28, 2008, available at LEXIS 2008 TNT 40-1.  
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simultaneously to constitute bad tax policy, bad energy policy, and bad 
environmental policy, in ways easily understood by the general public. It 
received extensive negative media coverage. The Bush administration 
(which seldom met a tax break it did not like) favored its repeal, and 
automobile manufacturers made no attempt to defend it. If Congress has 
not managed to repeal the SUV deduction, it seems unlikely that the 
results of the carbon audit will inspire Congress to repeal other—
seemingly less vulnerable—environmentally damaging provisions of the 
federal tax code. 
On the other hand, the increase in the section 179 ceiling from 
$25,000 to $100,000 may have worked strongly in favor of the deduction’s 
survival. The public outcry over the deduction seemed to demand some 
legislative response, and in the absence of the increase in the ceiling, the 
only obvious response would have been elimination of the loophole. 
Given the ceiling increase, however, Congress could satisfy the demand 
for some sort of action merely by returning the loophole to its original 
$25,000 level. Those with short memories—including, apparently, 
Taxpayers for Common Sense—would not recall that less than two years 
earlier they had been outraged by a $25,000 section 179 deduction for a 
large SUV.76 Perhaps the Duke of York (“he marched them up to the top 
of the hill and marched them down again”) aspect of the story was crucial 
to the deduction’s survival. If so, the story may tell us little about the 
likely fate of other environmentally objectionable provisions of the 
Internal Revenue Code. One might also point out, as an additional 
reason for optimism, that Congress did manage in 2008 to modestly 
reduce tax deductions for the oil and gas industry, thus proving that 
reductions in anti-green tax subsidies are not absolutely impossible.77 
 
76 The satisfaction of Taxpayers for Common Sense with the return of the 
loophole to its original (and previously objectionable) size is reminiscent of the 
Yiddish folk tale about the man who asks his rabbi for help with the overcrowding 
problem in his house. The rabbi tells the man to move his farm animals into the 
house. This, of course, only makes the problem worse. When the rabbi later tells the 
man to take the animals out of the house, the man is overjoyed that his house no 
longer seems crowded—even though it is just as crowded as when he first asked the 
rabbi for help. For a fine telling of the story in an illustrated children’s book, see 
MARGOT ZEMACH, IT COULD ALWAYS BE WORSE (1976). My thanks to Neil Buchanan for 
suggesting the analogy between the story of the SUV loophole and the story of the 
man with the overcrowded house. 
77 Energy Improvement and Extension Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, §§ 401–
02, 122 Stat. 3807, 3851–54 (2008) (limiting the domestic production activities 
deduction for income attributable to oil and gas production, and revising the foreign 
tax credit rules applicable to foreign oil and gas income). See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 
110TH CONG. ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE “ENERGY IMPROVEMENT AND 
EXTENSION ACT OF 2008,” SCHEDULED FOR CONSIDERATION ON THE SENATE FLOOR ON 
SEPTEMBER 23, 2008., at 4–5 (JCX-70-08R, 2008) (estimating the revenue effect of the 
two provisions, combined, at approximately $7 billion over ten years). 
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I am not wholly persuaded by the case for optimism. Despite the 
unusual Duke of York aspect of the SUV provision, it is hard to escape 
the conclusion that, all things considered, the SUV loophole was about as 
politically vulnerable as any anti-green tax break is ever likely to be. If 
that conclusion is correct, then the prospects for the greening of the 
Internal Revenue Code are not good. Part of the problem is a mindset, 
shared by a significant number of members of Congress, that tax 
increases are always bad, and that any closing of a loophole—no matter 
how unjustified the loophole may be—is a tax increase and thus must be 
resisted.78 Of course, political conditions are always changing, and (as the 
investment advisors say) past performance is no guarantee of future 
results. Increasing political concerns about budget deficits may make 
closing the loophole more attractive in the next few years than it was in 
the previous decade. Perhaps conditions in the not-too-distant future will 
be favorable for not only the repeal of the SUV loophole, but for the 
repeal of many other non-green tax provisions as well. One can always 
hope.  
 
78 See, e.g., SUV Loophole Provision to Face Stiff House Fight in FSC Negotiations, 3 
INSIDE FUELS & VEHICLES, Apr. 23, 2004 (“[A]ttempts to shrink the loophole have so 
far been unconvincing to House Republicans who view the provision as a tax increase, 
a House source said.”). 
